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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-BULK SALES ACT
AS APPLIED TO SALE OF FIXTURES BY
RESTAURATEUR
A restaurant was sold without compliance with the Virginia
Bulk Sales Act, VA. CODE ANN. §5187 (Michie, 1942). The
seller was subsequently adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt. Her
trustee in bankruptcy filed a petition for attachment of the equip-
ment and fixtures included in the sale, upon the ground that the trans-
fer was void as to creditors. The lower court sustained the conten-
tion of the trustee and entered a personal judgment against defendant
buyer for the amount of the debts owed prior to transfer. On appeal,
held, reversed. The transaction did not come within the scope of the
language of the Bulk Sales Act, which should be strictly construed.
O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214, 49 S. E. 2d 310 (1948).
The Virginia Bulk Sales Act, which follows the general pattern
of the New York Statute, used in two-thirds of the states,' provides
in effect that if anyone engaged in buying and selling merchandise,
sells, transfers, or assigns in bulk any port or the whole of a stock of
merchandise, or the fixtures pertaining to the conduct of said business,
otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, such sale shall be
void as to creditors of the seller, unless the seller and purchaser make
an inventory of the goods to be sold and unless the purchaser notifies
all of the creditors of the seller at least ten days before taking pos-
session of or paying for the goods.
It frequently happens that debtors, after selling their goods, de-
part from the jurisdiction and cannot be found by their creditors.
The purpose of Bulk Sales Acts is to prevent the debtor from de-
frauding his creditors by selling his goods in bulk, thereby putting
his assets beyond their reach.2
There is a conflict of authority as to whether these statutes
should be given a strict or a liberal construction. The majority of
jurisdictions hold that since the acts are in derrogation of the com-
mon law rights to sell or encumber property, and also impose a lia-
bility upon the purchaser, under certain circumstances, they should
not be extended to cover transactions not strictly within the scope of
the language employed.3 Other courts feel that since the acts are
remedial in nature, they should be given a liberal construction.4 In
Virginia the settled rule of construction is that even though a statute
be remedial, when, at the same time, it is also in derrogation of the
common law, it must be strictly construed.s
Retail merchants are the main class of sellers to which the statu-
tes apply, and there is a split among the states as to whether the act
is applicable to wholesalers. What other sellers are included within
the act will depend upon the language of the local statute and whether
or not the courts of the jurisdiction adopt a strict or a liberal con-
struction. The following types of sellers have been held not to come
within the statute: manufacturers and packers, pea canneries, logging
and lumbering, farmers, hotel owners, boardinghouse or roominghouse
keepers, lunch wagons, repair shops, bakeries, dyers and cleaners,
shoemakers, stonecutters, livery stable keepers, apartment house
owners, proprietors of pool and billiard halls, those whose business is
rendering personal services to others for hire, and restaurant keepers. 6
One reason advanced in the instant case for excluding restaurant
owners from the operation of the act is that they do not sell merchan-
dise but sell services. The same argument has been followed by
many courts in denying the liability of the restaurant owner in actions
based on the theory of breach of an implied warranty of whole-
someness of food served to customers, although Professor Williston
states7 and some courts have held that the transaction is of such a
nature that there may be an implied warranty even though it is not
deemed a sale of merchandise.8 It is said that the customer of a res-
taurant is privileged to satisfy his appetite, and no more. No title
to the food passes, except as an incident to the customer's consumption
of it.9 It is submitted that this reasoning is not necessary to the
decision of the principal case and may possibly deal a serious blow to
the application of the breach of warranty theory in cases hereafter
arising which involve the sale of unwholesome food by a restaurant.
The decision could have been confined to the reason given by the
court that a restaurant does not carry what may be designated as a
stock of merchandise as that term is used within the Bulk Sales Act.
Rather, like manufacturers, to whom the acts have been held not
to apply, their principal investment is equipment for the preparation
and serving of food, and they sell their product merely as an inci-
dent to the business.
Also if followed to a logical conclusion, the reasoning that there
is no sale of the food would produce absurd results. For example, a
person who ordered a meal in a restaurant and gave his dessert to
an accompanying friend would be guilty of the tort of conversion or
even a crime. However, it is probable that in such a case the courts
would find that the customer had a sufficient interest in the dessert
to make the gift without being a wrongdoer.
The holding in the instant case, that restaurants are not within
the scope of the Bulk Sales Act, is in accord with the weight of
authority, and seems to be a sound conclusion.
JOHN M. HOLLIS
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